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CLUES OF INTEGRITY IN THE
LEGAL REASONING PROCESS:
HOW JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES SHED
LIGHT ON THE RULE OF LAW
Harvey Rishikof*
Bernard Horowitz**
ONE of the fascinating dimensions of historiography is the ten-dency of genres of historical scholarship to come in and out offashion. In the 1940s, when Mark DeWolfe Howe began his au-
thorized biography of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, not many scholars
could expect to penetrate the circles of family members, executors, law
clerks, and disciples that restricted access to information about “their”
judge. Moreover, few collections of the private papers of judges were
available, and even fewer collections of their internal court papers. There
were many reasons not to write judicial biography, and the major biogra-
phies of Supreme Court Justices could have been counted on the fingers
of one hand. Fifty years later the situation is dramatically different. The
number of judicial biographies has proliferated, and with some important
exceptions, authorized biographies have virtually disappeared. The trend
seems to be increasingly in the direction of comprehensive, heavily docu-
mented, unauthorized biographies simultaneously aimed at several
reader audiences.1
I fear he will be forgotten in a generation or so; indeed I doubt that
many law students today have any idea who he is. The people who
get the attention are those with agendas; it is the virtues of the
polemicist that attract notice, not those of the careful and invariably
correct lawyer. [Thus] . . . Weinfeld . . . is [not] likely to survive. And
that is, of course, far more of a negative reflection on our culture
than on the judge.2
* Harvey Rishikof, Dean of Faculty of the National War College. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or posi-
tion of the National Defense University, the National War College, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.
** Bernard Horowitz is a Research Fellow with the American Bar Association’s
Standing Committee on Law & National Security.
1. G. Edward White, The Renaissance of Judicial Biography, 23 REV. AM. HIST. 716
(1995).
2. WILLIAM E. NELSON, IN PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE: EDWARD WEINFELD AS
LAWYER AND JUDGE 2 (2004). Professor William Nelson’s book illustrates the modus oper-
andi of a formidable jurist. See id. at ix. It scrutinizes Judge Edward Weinfeld’s background
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The larger phenomenon at hand is the rise of judicial biography as a
genre. How does the increased inspection of judges’ backgrounds illumi-
nate their jurisprudence? Is the biographical examination of judges
mainly an exercise in voyeurism, or does it serve a significant purpose in
understanding the judicial process?
Like soldiers, federal judges are viewed as public servants enforcing the
law, upholding the Constitution, and serving the Republic.3 They are an
exclusive class of political actors with a specialized culture, comprising a
select group of approximately 874: 9 Supreme Court Justices, 179 appel-
late judges, and 677 district court judges.4 In addition to the active judges,
there also exists a critical corps of retired senior-status judges who con-
tinue to adjudicate cases.5 For better or worse, they speak with clear
voices, take public legal positions, and make decisions.
The stakes are high because there are no ties in the law. Judges articu-
late their decisions and opinions in print. Trial judges have unique power
in that they shape trials by ruling on issues of evidence, fact, and law, and
then issue an opinion to decide the case in the first instance. Appellate
judges, although they see no witnesses or direct evidence, can dissent and
explain why the majorities are wrong when ruling to uphold or reverse a
trial judge.
Unlike others who wield power, judges often work without fanfare,
away from klieg lights and cameras. Historically, they refrained from giv-
ing interviews, rarely wrote books, and avoided the limelight, preferring
to let their opinions speak for themselves.6 However, with the rise of
mass media during the late-twentieth century, it became impossible to
open a newspaper, watch the news, or surf the Internet without being
presented with the latest sex or financial scandal involving the church,
government, or Wall Street. All these former pillars of society—clergy,
politicians, and bankers—seem to be drowning in a sea of hypocrisy, ab-
sence of shame, and potential criminality. How has such scrutiny affected
the judiciary?
Recently, the University of Texas School of Law held a conference on
in order to contextualize one of the enduring judicial careers of the twentieth century. See
id.
3. Federal Courts in American Government, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/FederalCourtsInAmericanGovernment
.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
4. Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Feder
alJudgeships.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
5. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQs
.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (“What is of a Senior Judge? The Rule of 80 is the com-
monly used shorthand for the age and service requirement for a judge to assume senior
status, as set forth in Title 28 of the US. Code, Section 371(c). Beginning at age 65, a judge
may retire at his or her current salary or take senior status after performing 15 years of
active service as an Article III judge (65+15=80). A sliding scale of increasing age and
decreasing service results in eligibility for retirement compensation at age 70 with a mini-
mum of 10 years of service (70+10=80). Senior judges, who essentially provide volunteer
service to the courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts’ workload
annually.”).
6. See White, supra note 1, at 716.
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the emerging golden age of judicial biography and the Supreme Court.7
A list of approximately thirty books on the Court since 1983 was pro-
vided as background for the discussion.8 Indeed, the past three decades
have yielded a rise in literature that analyzes judgeship. Should we view
the rise of the judicial biography as a fallow extension of the increased
public focus on the judiciary, or does it serve a purpose?
In parsing this matter, two central questions arise. First, how often do
judges incorporate their own policy preferences into their decisions, and
how openly does this appear in their work? Second, does biographical
analysis of judges shed light on how a judicial philosophy formed or
evolved over time?
The application of a popular media culture to the judiciary may some-
what violate its traditional nature and role. However, if the biographical
scrutiny of judging can elucidate policy preferences from judges’ life ex-
periences and evaluate their jurisprudence commensurately, then the rise
of the judicial biography may arguably play the role of a brand-new, ret-
rospective accountability mechanism.
I. JUDICIAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF AMERICAN HISTORY
Comprehensive official accountability mechanisms for judges have ex-
isted from the beginning, when they were written into the Constitution.9
Although Article III contemplates removal by impeachment, no Su-
preme Court justice has ever been successfully impeached, though it was
tried with Samuel Chase in 1804—1805.10 The unsuccessful attempt to
impeach Chase helped furnish the principle that justices are not removed
for unpopular views or opinions.11 The origins of this judicial indepen-
dence stems from the paradigm-setting case of Marbury v. Madison in
1803, which established the Court’s authority to rule unconstitutional a
law passed by Congress, declaring, “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”12 In the late 1930s,
President Franklin Roosevelt’s failure to “pack” the Supreme Court ce-
mented the concept of an independent court.13 These three historic
events—Marbury, the failed impeachment, and the discredited court-
packing—enshrined the American commitment to an independent judici-
ary as a counter-majoritarian institution that checks pure democratic or
7. See A Conference on Judicial Biography and the Supreme Court, U. TEX. SCH. L.,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/judicial-biography/ (last visited Oct. . 4, 2014).
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 104—05 (1992).
11. Id.
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
13. When the court appeared to be rejecting his New Deal legislation, Roosevelt intro-
duced legislation to add an additional justice, up to a maximum of six, for every justice
then serving who was 70 years and 6 months old. REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 133.
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political rule.14
As reflected by these three events, any discussion of the American ju-
dicial culture requires a deep appreciation of American political and legal
history. Many of the cherished values and rights now enjoyed by the citi-
zens of the United States were borne of legal and political struggles.15
The results of these debates helped shape our constitutional framework
and have been passed down from generation to generation.16 This is not
to say, however, that once an issue has been “settled” in the constitu-
tional sense, it is no longer open to debate.17 In fact the opposite may be
more the order of the day, whereby a past dissent resurrects itself to forge
a majority for the next generation.18 The best examples of this phenome-
non are the early dissents by Associate Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis in the 1920s concerning the right of privacy,
which eventually became the law forty years later under Chief Justice
Earl Warren.19 This tradition of a principled dissent has done much to
support the concept of the individual voice standing for important values.
While this framework is well-established and categorically accepted,
judges at the highest levels differ on the guidelines of jurisprudence.20
Some earnestly assert that their personal backgrounds have no influence
whatsoever on judging.21 Others openly acknowledge that their analysis is
heavily contingent on their roots and experiences.22
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice
Roberts employed a now-famous metaphor: “Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire
and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules
. . . .”23 Of course, as umpires are fond of saying, “They are not balls or
strikes until I call them.”24 In Justice Samuel A. Alito’s confirmation, the
widely respected Third Circuit Judge Ed Becker noted, “When you take
14. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW
IT WAS, HOW IT IS 33, 307 (1987); REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 104–05.
15. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Convention, 27
J.L. & POL. 63 (2011).
16. See id.
17. See Katz v. United states, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 471—85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471.
19. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
20. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (hereinafter Robert Hearing) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.); Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 655–56 (2006) (hereinaf-
ter Alito Hearing) (statement of Edward R. Backer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania); Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKE-
LEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 91–92 (2002).
21. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 20, at 55.
22. See Sotomayor, supra note 20, at 91–92.
23. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 20, at 55.
24. Jim Lindgreen, Roberts’ Umpire Analogy is Not Quite as Simple as It Seems,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.volokh.com/2005/09/12/roberts-umpire-
analogy-is-not-quite-as-simple-as-it-seems/.
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that judicial oath, you become a different person. You decide cases not to
reach the result that you would like, but based on what the facts and the
law command.”25
Conversely, Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has stated:
I . . . accept that our experiences as women and people of color affect
our decisions. . . . Not all women or people of color, in all or some
circumstances or indeed in any particular case or circumstance but
enough people of color in enough cases, will make a difference in the
process of judging . . . . As recognized by legal scholars, whatever the
reason, not one woman or person of color in any one position but as
a group we will have an effect on the development of the law and on
judging.
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cul-
tural differences, a possibility I abhor less or discount less than my
colleague Judge Cedarbaum, our gender and national origins may
and will make a difference in our judging. Justice O’Connor has
often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise old woman
will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases . . . . I would hope
that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who
hasn’t lived that life.26
However, while the statements of Justices Roberts and Sotomayor re-
flect differing outlooks, they matter little unless they are evaluated in
conjunction with the judicial record. Judges may have strong views con-
cerning how backgrounds should factor into jurisprudence, but these
views have little relevance unless they arise in practice; Justice Roberts
may view himself as an umpire, and Justice Sotomayor may express spe-
cial empathy for the perspective of a Latina, but how do these stances
manifest?
Critics of biography believe that more social scientific study of the judi-
cial process will yield a sounder understanding of a judge’s analytical the-
ories and results.27 For commentators such as Judge Richard Posner,
studies of the judicial process should be considered as an alternative to
judicial biography due to of some of the inherent problems with biogra-
phy in general and judicial biography in particular.28 Judicial biographies
too often focus on ideology or discovering the subject’s essential self.29
These ideological biographies are prone to depart from truth, and the
essential nature of the subject is often a fiction created by the biogra-
pher.30 Writings on judges and courts are more constructive when they
25. See Alito Hearing, supra note 20, at 655–56; see also Theodore A. McKee, Judges
As Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007) (This law review was helpful in exploring
how judges’ personal views influence their jurisprudence.).
26. See Sotomayor, supra note 20, at 91–92.
27. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 503 (1995).
28. See id. at 516–21.
29. See id. at 503.
30. See id. at 504–05.
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analyze cases and the deliberative process.31
However, there will be hard cases. In hard cases, “personal beliefs”
should be made explicit for the purposes of transparency.32 Judge Harry
Edwards, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, once
explained:
While a judge typically will not need to resort to personal beliefs in
deciding cases, some consideration of these beliefs may be unavoida-
ble in the occasional “very hard” case where the legal arguments are
indeterminate. In such a case, a judge’s informed and critical devel-
opment of his [or her] beliefs is a prerequisite to intelligent resolu-
tion of the dispute. Further, in all cases, the nature of one’s personal
beliefs should be consciously, rather than subconsciously,
recognized.33
Therefore, as has been pointed out by scholars, judicial biography can
serve a number of purposes. It can use a life history to give perspective on
a period, illustrate a career path, and demonstrate links between person-
ality and judicial decision-making.34
II. THE FUEL FOR THE CONTROVERSY:
BACKGROUNDS IN PLAY
The popular attraction of scrutinizing the background of a jurist was
underscored and fueled by Associate Justice John Paul Stevens in a 2010
interview with the New York Times, in which he discussed his approach
to cases and his World War II experience:
“It really was a unique period of time, in the sense that the total
country, with very few exceptions, was really united,” Justice Stevens
said. “We were all on the same team, wanting the same result. You
don’t like to think of war as having anything good about it, but it is
something that was a positive experience.”35
Moreover, Stevens appeared “unapologetic in saying that the justices’
backgrounds necessarily shaped their approaches to the law.”36 He par-
ticularly noted, “‘I’ve confessed to many people that I think my personal
experience has had an impact on what I’ve done . . . . Time and time
again, not only for myself but for other people on the court, during dis-
cussions of cases you bring up experiences that you are familiar with.’”37
Justice Stevens explained that
31. See id. at 521.
32. See McKee, supra note 25, at 1717.
33. Id. at 1718 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society:
Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 385, 409—10 (1984).
34. See Symposium, Objectivity and Hagiography in Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV., 556, 567 (1995).
35. See Adam Liptak, At 89, Stevens Contemplates Law, and How to Leave It, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at A1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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[h]is military service, as a Navy cryptographer, informed his dissent
in Texas v. Johnson, a 1989 decision holding that the First Amend-
ment protects flag burning. “I know it’s not the popular position, but
I’m still totally convinced I was right,” he stated. “I still think I was
right, but I wouldn’t amend the Constitution or anything like that to
straighten it out.”38
Perhaps one key to understanding a judicial philosophy stems from the
early life experiences of a jurist. One cannot underestimate, however,
how being on a court over time affects how a jurist begins to see the
process of judging. For example, despite numerous prior decisions to the
contrary, Justice Harry Blackmun eventually concluded that the death
penalty is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, regardless of original
interpretations of the Constitution.39 In 1994, in Callins v. Collins, he
proclaimed:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have
struggled—along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedu-
ral and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appear-
ance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue
to coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has
been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally
and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficien-
cies. . . . The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and
moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some
defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reli-
able sentences of death required by the Constitution.40
What in Justice Blackmun’s background can explain this change after
twenty years? Was it his time spent as the general counsel at the Mayo
Clinic? Was it the seminars at the Aspen Institute in which he partici-
pated in as a Justice? Linda Greenhouse, based on her research on this
point, contends that Blackmun’s Roe v. Wade decision was premised on
his Mayo experience in that he originally viewed the case more through
the lens of the fundamental personal liberty to receive medical care and
the doctor-patient prism than a woman’s fundamental right to control her
body.41 Moreover, his Mayo research had also “persuaded him that the
criminalization of abortion was a relatively recent phenomenon, without
roots in the English common-law tradition.”42
38. Id.
39. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1145–46.
41. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 92, 223 (2005).
42. Id. at 92.
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Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg raised eyebrows when she com-
mented to USA Today that during oral argument her male colleagues
seemed to downplay the trauma of a 13-year-old girl who had been
stripped-searched by Arizona school officials looking for drugs.43 “‘They
have never been a 13-year-old girl . . . . It’s a very sensitive age for a girl. I
didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood.’”44 In
the end the Court ruled 8-1 in the girl’s favor.45  Ginsburg further noted,
“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made. I don’t say
(the split) should be 50-50 . . . . It could be 60% men, 40% women, or the
other way around. It shouldn’t be that women are the exception.”46 Gins-
burg then went on to reveal:
“You know the line that [Justice Sandra Day O’Connor] and I keep
repeating . . . that ‘at the end of the day, a wise old man and a wise
old woman reach the same judgment’? But there are perceptions
that we have because we are women. It’s a subtle influence. We can
be sensitive to things that are said in draft opinions that (male jus-
tices) are not aware can be offensive. The differences between male
and female justices, she said, are “seldom in the outcome.” But then,
she added, “it is sometimes in the outcome.”47
The issue of a “wise old man or woman” alluded to by Justice Ginsburg
stemmed from an earlier controversy over the aforementioned speech
given during a symposium at the University of California School of Law
at Berkeley by then-Court of Appeals Judge Sonia Sotomayor.48 In that
speech, Judge Sotomayor said, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a
better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”49 The con-
ference’s theme was “Raising the Bar: Latino and Latina Presence in the
Judiciary and the Struggle for Representation.”50 During Justice
Sotomayor’s confirmation process, the “wise Latina woman” comment
was a source of much debate and analysis.51
43. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg:  Court Needs  Another Woman, USA TODAY (Oct. 5,
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htm
(“One of Ginsburg’s liberal colleagues, fellow Clinton appointee Stephen Breyer, saw it a
little differently. He said he had a hard time understanding the girl’s claim that her rights
had been violated. ‘I’m trying to work out why is this a major thing to, say, strip down to
your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym,’ Breyer said. ‘How bad is
this?’ Ginsburg retorted that school officials had directed Redding ‘to shake (her) bra out,
to shake, shake, stretch the top of (her) pants.’ She later told USA TODAY, ‘Maybe a 13-
year-old boy in a locker room doesn’t have that same feeling about his body. But a girl
who’s just at the age where she is developing, whether she has developed a lot . . . or . . .
has not developed at all (might be) embarrassed about that.”).
44. Id.
45. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
46. Biskupic, supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Sotomayor, supra note 20, at 92.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Frank James, Sotomayor’s ‘Wise Latina’ Line Maybe Not So Wise, NPR (May 27,
2009), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/05/sotomayors_wise_latina_line_ma
.html.
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Part of the point of Sotomayor’s speech was that the life experiences of
women and minorities in the law affect their work, “leading to an ulti-
mate outcome of greater overall justice.”52 Disagreeing with Federal Dis-
trict Court Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, Sotomayor revealed
conversations she had with Cedarbaum in which her colleague had ar-
gued that judges should consciously “strive to . . . keep their gender and
race or ethnicity from impacting their decisions.” For Sotomayor, as she
explained in her talk:
While recognizing the potential effect of individual experiences on
perception, Judge Cedarbaum nevertheless believes that judges must
transcend their personal sympathies and prejudices and aspire to
achieve a greater degree of fairness and integrity based on the reason
of law. Although I agree with and attempt to work toward Judge
Cedarbaum’s aspiration, I wonder whether achieving that goal is
possible in all or even in most cases. And I wonder whether by ignor-
ing our differences as women or men of color we do a disservice both
to the law and society.53
She then provided an example of how women judges impact the judicial
process in ways observed by legal scholars:
I further accept that our experiences as women and people of color
affect our decisions. The aspiration to impartiality is just that—it’s an
aspiration because it denies the fact that we are by our experiences
making different choices than others. Not all women or people of
color, in all or some circumstances or indeed in any particular case or
circumstance but enough people of color in enough cases, will make
a difference in the process of judging. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has given an example of this. As reported by Judge Patricia Wald,
formerly of the D.C. Circuit Court, three women on the Minnesota
Court with two men dissenting agreed to grant a protective order
against a father’s visitation rights when the father abused his child.
The Judicature Journal has at least two excellent studies on how wo-
men on the courts of appeal and state supreme courts have tended to
vote more often than their male counterpart to uphold women’s
claims in sex discrimination cases and criminal defendants’ claims in
search and seizure cases. As recognized by legal scholars, whatever
the reason, not one woman or person of color in any one position but
as a group we will have an effect on the development of the law and
on judging.54
It is in this context that she made the comment about a “wise Latina
woman” that proved to be so explosive:55 “I would hope that a wise La-
tina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that
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ferent backgrounds bring a different perspective to the law. But if the law
is based on impartial logical syllogisms and is different than politics, why
should background per se make a difference?
Stuart Taylor, a conservative legal commentator for the National Jour-
nal, criticized the Sotomayor speech along these lines, arguing that such
an approach privileged “identity politics” over legal analysis:
Indeed, unless Sotomayor believes that Latina women also make
better judges than Latino men, and also better than African-Ameri-
can men and women, her basic proposition seems to be that white
males (with some exceptions, she noted) are inferior to all other
groups in the qualities that make for a good jurist.57
As pointed out by Stuart Taylor in his analysis of the Sotomayor speech
Any prominent white male would be instantly and properly banished
from polite society as a racist and a sexist for making an analogous
claim of ethnic and gender superiority or inferiority.
Imagine the reaction if someone had unearthed in 2005 a speech in
which then-Judge Samuel Alito had asserted, for example: “I would
hope that a white male with the richness of his traditional American
values would reach a better conclusion than a Latina woman who
hasn’t lived that life”—and had proceeded to speak of “inherent
physiological or cultural differences.”58
While the Supreme Court’s authority would be tainted by rulings based
on “inherent physiological or cultural differences,” its appointment pro-
cess does appreciate cultural interests and ethnic or geographic back-
grounds.59 At the beginning of the Court’s history there was a “western
seat,” and at the turn of the century, a “Jewish seat,” a “Catholic seat,”
and later a “black seat.”60 The assumption was that “eastern” judges
would have a different sensibility than “western” judges.61 Over time,
however, these sectional, religious and racial identifiers have fallen
away.62 Court watchers noted that with Justice Stevens’ retirement, the
Court no longer included a Justice with a military or Protestant back-
ground,63 depriving the Court of these functional views. Moreover, since
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s retirement there is no Justice on the Court
57. Stuart Taylor, Identity Politics And Sotomayor: The Judge’s Thinking Is Represen-




60. See Adam Liptak, Stevens, the Only Protestant on the Supreme Court, Week in
Review, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at wk 1.
61. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 61 (1994).
62. See Liptak, supra note 60.
63. See NAT’L CONSTITUTION CENT., Here’s Another Take on the Importance of Diver-
sity: Does the Supreme Court Need a Military Veteran?, CONST. DAILY (June 1, 2011), http:/
/blog.constitutioncenter.org/2011/06/heres-another-take-on-the-importance-of-diversity-
does-the-supreme-court-need-a-military-veteran/.
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who has defended an accused in a capital case.64
The essential reason that the possibly improper overemphasis of iden-
tity is less important (or worrisome) is that legal opinions are published,
and the reasoning of a Justice’s view is open for all to read and analyze.
Since culture war issues such as abortion often raise questions regarding
the religious affiliation of a justice, the debate is couched in state’s rights
and the appropriate role of government or the conflict of different theo-
ries over rights allocation.65 Judges who feel that their background has an
impact must find an outlet through which to express their views outside
the realm of judicial opinions. The previously cited statements of Stevens,
Blackmun, and Ginsburg are all examples (Justice Sotomayor’s assertion
falls into a new category, since it is not a reflection on a prior ruling, but a
prescription for future cases.).66
So, what makes judges “tick” has spilled past formal, published opin-
ions and into the public discourse, becoming what is now a growth indus-
try; these motifs are crystallized in increasingly popular judicial
biographies.
III. BIOGRAPHY AS LEGAL HISTORY
The focus on the Supreme Court biography seems natural due to the
Court’s power at the pinnacle of the judicial branch. In the words of Jus-
tice Robert Jackson’s witticism concerning the Court, “We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are fi-
nal.”67 To be accurate, though, under the Constitution’s Article V, it is
the amendment process or the will of the people that is final.68
Another reason that the Supreme Court Justices incur biographical
analysis is that they possess the greatest degree of intellectual freedom on
how to interpret the Constitution. Different philosophies tend to be asso-
ciated with different Justices—“Oliver Wendell Holmes’s skeptical prag-
matism, William J. Brennan’s expansive liberalism, Antonin Scalia’s
insistent originalism.”69 As Laurence Tribe has pointed out, the Constitu-
tion floats in an “invisible . . . ocean of ideas, prepositions, recovered
memories, and imagined experiences,” called the “dark matter.”70 To de-
cipher the invisible Constitution, Tribe posits six distinct but overlapping
modes of interpretation—“geometric, geodesic, global, geological, gravita-
tional, and gyroscopic.”71 As he concludes, this competition over effective
64. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME CT., www.sup
remecourt.gov/about/biographies (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
65. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 41, at 93—94.
66. See id.; Sotomayor, supra note 20, at 91; Biskupic, supra note 43; Liptak, supra
note 35.
67. Eugene C. Gerhart, Robert H. Jackson: Lawyer’s Judge, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 395,
397 (1962).
68. U.S. CONST. art. V.
69. See Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court be Like Without Its
Liberal Leader?, THE NEW YORKER, March 22, 2010.
70. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION xiv (2008).
71. Id. at 155.
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interpretive approaches to meaning is the struggle: “It is not the visible or
invisible character of our constitutional commitments but their irreduci-
ble ambiguity and multidimensionality that ensures our continuing strug-
gle over their meaning.”72 Given this struggle over possible interpretative
techniques, how a Justice comes to identify with one over another over
time begs for biographical clues since the stakes are so high for the consti-
tutional vision and the understanding of rights.73
Finally, perhaps the most notable reason by which the Supreme Court
is ripe for biographical dissection is the aura of mystery that surrounds it.
As Walter Bagehot once noted in describing the British Crown, “A little
mystery is a good thing.”74 The chambers are isolated, tight communities
where the judges have chosen all the employees. Each Justice has two
secretaries, a court aide, and four law clerks, although the Chief Justice is
allowed one more.75 “The permanent staffs are lean, fiercely loyal, com-
petent, and long-serving. These public servants are loath to write kiss-
and-tell memoirs. Though occasionally books such as The Brethren,76
Closed Chambers77 or The Nine78 have been written to pierce the black
veil, these are the exceptions and not the rule.”79
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has in its latest Guide to the Preser-
vation of Federal Judges’ Papers emphasized how important this resource
should be for history writing:
Perhaps the greatest potential contribution to be made by judges’
papers is toward broad studies of legal history. The papers of federal
judges can help to explain a wide variety of topics related to law and
public life, including the evolution of legal doctrine, court enforce-
ment of federal legislation, and popularly organized litigation cam-
paigns. Judges’ papers can also be useful for analyzing a speci?c case
or related cases. Unfortunately, the relative scarcity of judges’ collec-
tions in repositories, and the difficulty in locating these scattered pa-
pers, have deterred many researchers from taking advantage of this
kind of historical resource.80
72. Id. at 211.
73. Id.
74. Harvey Rishikof, The United States Supreme Court: The Cult of the Robe in the
National Security Enterprise, in THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE: NAVIGATING THE
LABYRINTH 249 (Roger Z. George & Harvey Rishikof ed., 2011).
75. Id.
76. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
77. EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT (1998).
78. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (2007).
79. Rishikof, supra note 74, at 249.
80. See BRUCE A. RAGSDALE & JONATHAN W. WHITE, FED. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF-
FICE, A GUIDE TO THE PRESERVATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES’ PAPERS 4–5 (2d ed. 2009)
(The guide notes, “Judicial biography has attracted increased attention in recent years, as
demonstrated by the growing number of scholarly publications not only on Supreme Court
justices, but also district and appellate court judges, such as Learned Hand, Sarah T.
Hughes, Willis Ritter, Edward Weinfeld, and John Minor Wisdom. These biographies rely
in part on personal papers, which bring life and texture to the of?cial records of those
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The Guide then goes on to detail how to preserve papers and encour-
ages the keeping of private case-related files, chambers papers, other
court-related activities, and non-judicial activities.81 Interestingly, the
Guide also includes examples of when the papers should be released and
under what conditions researchers may have access: at the death of the
jurist; after all the jurists with whom the jurist has served have died; or,
with the permission of the jurist, following their death, access will require
permission of surviving spouse, and subsequently, the executor for ?fteen
years following the death of the judge’s last surviving spouse.82
As an institution, judges support and recognize the need for maintain-
ing their papers, allowing others to experience their deliberative process
at an appropriate time in the future.83 This is one of many ways that the
institution, as a whole, demonstrates a commitment to transparency and
legitimacy. Therein lies the significance of the judicial biography enter-
prise: if such analysis explicates the impact of backgrounds on jurispru-
dence (or lack thereof), biographical dissection of judges becomes much
more than a public-interest spectacle; it is a powerful retroactive account-
ability mechanism. Here, judges’ off-the-bench statements may be prop-
erly assessed in full jurisprudential context, rather than by speculative
predictions at the time.
For obvious reasons, Supreme Court Justices are the most popular
targets for judicial biography. This reflects not only the power wielded by
the Justices, but also an uneven selection from the judiciary. The modern
tendency for presidents is to choose justices from the appellate ranks,
increasingly adding to the public prominence of appellate judges.84 These
judges have the advantage of already having been confirmed by the Sen-
ate and may have “signaled” their legal tendencies in thoughtful opinions
and dissents. Also, appellate judges are empowered to overturn the rul-
ings of trial judges, thereby setting the parameters for the legal debate of
the higher court, a vital function to the judging process.85 Hence, trial
judges may not garner the attention they deserve from biographers, de-
spite the fact that they wield substantially more evaluative power than
appellate judges, who can only overturn “clearly erroneous” trial
judges’ courts. In his study of Judge Weinfeld, William Nelson found that only ‘an unusu-
ally rich collection of personal papers’ enabled him to trace the challenges that Weinfeld
faced in establishing his professional career. The authors of Judge Ritter’s biography ac-
knowledged that their book ‘would be seriously de?cient’ without access to the judge’s
papers. The ‘voluminous’ papers of Judge Hughes allowed the biographer to recount the
full career of one of the most important women leaders in Texas public life during the mid-
twentieth century.”).
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 37–41. (Appendix A: Survey of Access Restrictions Placed on Manuscript
Collections by Federal Judges; Access Policies for Selected Research Collections of Federal
Judges Who Have Donated Their Papers to Manuscript Repositories.).
83. See id. at 2.
84. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 64 (noting the
backgrounds of each justice).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
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rulings.86
The power of the trial judge and the value of biography is on display in
William E. Nelson’s In Pursuit of Right and Justice, an account of the life
of Judge Edward Weinfeld.87 It is important to note that Nelson was a
Weinfeld clerk and had the total cooperation of the Weinfeld family.88 In
addition, Nelson clerked for Justice Byron White in the 1970 term.89 Pro-
fessor Nelson offered three reasons for his biography on Judge Edward
Weinfeld that went beyond pure admiration of the New York district
court judge:
1. Judge Weinfeld’s background and rise to prominence paradigmati-
cally illustrates how Catholic and Jewish immigrants (and their children)
generally were assimilated into New York City (and the United States at
large) in the early twentieth century.90
2. Drawing from the full wealth of Judge Weinfeld’s papers, Professor
Nelson opines that the record “enables us to examine the compromises
[Weinfeld] had to make in order to attain professional advancement,”
specifically the social-cultural compromises and “sacrifices” he navigated
to become assimilated, even sometimes including “family
relationships;”91
3. Professor Nelson asserts that Judge Weinfeld was the “the pre-emi-
nent trial judge of twentieth-century America.” For Nelson, Weinfeld ex-
emplified a style of progressive apolitical restraint (marked by a hesitancy
to make new law and a refusal to make policy), close attention to the
facts before him, and a desire “only to do justice between the parties.”92
Any of these three claims alone would suffice to warrant a biography.
The first two—an assimilation story and the story of the private sacrifice
for public obligation and success—speak to how one individual’s struggle
can be paradigmatic for a whole cohort of individuals or a morality play
for those who strive for perfection in a profession. The final justification
(into which the first two feed)—the judging style of a trial judge—speaks
to the issue of this essay: how does one’s background shape a judge’s
jurisprudence, and how do trial judges exercise their discretion?
Weinfeld’s background represents the quintessential story of a child of
immigrants encouraged by the establishment to embrace a new American
culture at the turn of the twentieth century:
Like most children of Jewish immigrants of his era, Weinfeld appears
to have been eager to absorb the school system’s message of assimi-
86. Id.
87. NELSON, supra note 2.
88. Id. at ix.
89. Id. at 291.
90. Id. at 2–3; Renee Ann Cramer, Review of In Pursuit of Right and Justice: Edward
Weinfeld as Lawyer and Judge, 15 L. & PUB. BOOK REV. 187, 187-90, available at http://
www.lawcourts.org/LPBR/reviews/nelson305.htm.
91. NELSON, supra note 2, at 3; Cramer, supra note 90.
92. NELSON, supra note 2, at 4–5; Cramer, supra note 90. These three reasons have not
convinced all the critics. This section quotes liberally from Renee Ann Cramer’s review but
I do not in the end agree with her final assessments of the book.
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lation. Like other children, he may have paid a price for being assim-
ilated. One child of immigrants, perhaps more sensitive than most,
was “appalled,” for example, “to think what an immense transforma-
tion I had to work on myself in order to become what I have to
become”—a transformation involving “a kind of treason in it: trea-
son toward my family.” Here, it might be worth noting that, while
Weinfeld always remained a dutiful son to his parents, he became
quite distant after their death from his brother, Morris, and other
more distant relatives, and he was never close to his wife’s family.93
Weinfeld’s early assimilation into American society informed a judicial
philosophy, which in description closely resembles the role of the umpire
described by Justice Roberts.94 In Chapter 7, “The Making of A Judge,”
Nelson explains, “Once Weinfeld was on the bench, politics ceased, as he
sought wisdom from nonpolitical sources so as to make himself into an
outstanding judge.”95 This wisdom was collected in Weinfeld’s green,
leather-bound “commonplace book” into which he copied quotes and
sources of inspiration to guide and shape his “judicial per-
sona.”96 Weinfeld relied upon Old Testament teachings and sought gui-
dance from Chief Justices John Marshall and Charles Evans Hughes,
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis, and Judges Au-
gustus N. Hand and Learned Hand.97 Many of the quotes in the book
concern the concept of impartiality, as well as the need for exhaustive
work, dignity, aloofness, adequate study, and reflection.98 These quotes
give us insight into Weinfeld’s judicial style and temperament, which are
detailed in Chapter 8 (“The Patriarch: Edward Weinfeld’s Judicial Style”)
and Chapter 9 (“The Liberal: Edward Weinfeld’s Judicial Values”), and
which further the claim that Weinfeld’s legal style was nonpolitical.99
For example, in the interest of fairness, unlike many trial judges, Judge
Weinfeld would not discuss settlement with the parties since he did not
want to be seen to be bringing about a settlement that might differ from
the jury’s conclusion.100 He viewed himself as a “fact judge” who could
“find the law” to resolve an issue.101 In case after case, he transformed or
circumvented unresolved questions of law into fact questions.102 Nelson
attributes this deep instinct to cabin his own “discretion” to his first year
on the bench in a case of first impression, Austrian v. Williams, when his
decision to apply federal law over state law in a trustee bankruptcy case
was subsequently overruled by the Court of Appeals.103 Nelson then goes
on to catalogue six cases where the technique of restricting his own dis-
93. NELSON, supra note 2, at 19.
94. Compare id., with Roberts Hearing, supra note 20, at 55.
95. NELSON, supra note 2, at 114.
96. Id. at 123.
97. Id. at 126–27.
98. Id. at 127.
99. Id. at vii.
100. Id. at 136.
101. Id. at 139.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 140–41.
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cretion by turning “unresolved law into fact determination” is put on dis-
play—United States v Toney; United States v. Bethlehem Steel; United
Stares ex rel. Elkins v. Gilligan; Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commis-
sion; United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n;
and United States v. Kaplan.104
This fact-based approach—restricting decisions to the case and cur-
tailing his own personal discretion to the case and facts—was at the core
of how Weinfeld reconciled his unwillingness to incorporate his own pol-
icy preferences with his awareness that policy was an inevitable ingredi-
ent of the law.105 By refusing to participate in plea-bargaining as a matter
found in the law, Weinfeld ensured that juries made the decision on how
policy trade-offs should be made, per the institution’s preference as a
court of law.106 Weinfeld focused on individuals and the purview of the
court’s power to enforce “due process and the equal protection of the
law.”107 These principles were enshrined in the court as a social policy
and therefore were his legitimate tools of advocacy, an institutional
advocacy.108
For Nelson, this “Weinfeld approach” avoided the politicization of de-
cisions because of his unique view of equality and justice, which eschews
Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that her ethnic background necessarily im-
pacts her jurisprudence:
Weinfeld did not pursue a vision of equality that divides society into
classes and interest groups at war with each other. Thus, he never
had to focus on the perverse question whether a judgment in a case
would give a particular group or class more or less than its fair share
of the societal pie. This question . . . creates a sharp dichotomy in the
thinking of a judge between fidelity to law and considerations of so-
cial policy. Judges who focus on the question can never decide any
issue of law without favoring some social groups or interests over
others . . . [H]er vision of justice will always be controlling—it will
prescribe how much of a role preexisting legal doctrine will play in
the determination of cases.109
Weinfeld’s approach of focusing on the individual was different be-
cause the case became about the individual rather than a grand social
policy: he was administering the institutional mandate of protecting free-
dom and curtailing violations and abuses.110 With this approach he could
give full reign to his discretion as an institutional matter:
He saw only individuals, not groups and classes, in the litigants who
came to his court. For him, equal justice was not about the distribu-
tion of wealth and power, but about the behavior of government to-
104. Id. at 141–53.
105. Id. at 139.
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id. at 157.
108. See id. at 171.
109. Id. at 170–71.
110. Id. at 171.
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wards citizens. . . . since his vision was different—it required only
that he adhere consistently to the rule of law—it never created a
conflict with the imperative of fidelity to law that a judge with a vi-
sion of equality as distributional justice would face. Instead, it di-
rected fidelity to law.111
Indeed, on the left, critics dismiss the notion of separating law and
politics as naı¨ve and contend that the rule of law itself is a result of power
relations between different cultures.112 In fact, it is not views of the world
that “divide[ ] society into classes and interest groups at war with each
other.”113 Rather, realities of the world—unequal distributions of wealth
and power, for instance—affect that division, which is often maintained
by the rule of law.114 To these commentators, the “American mono-cul-
ture” into which Weinfeld was assimilated is a fallacy and an offensive
abrogation of multiculturalism.115
Conversely, critics on the right view the use of “due process and equal
protection” to protect the individual in the face of the exercise of execu-
tive power, for example, as a classic case of judicial activism and an impe-
rial judiciary.116
However, both sides fail to grasp that the “Weinfeld approach,” at the
trial level, was an attempt to cabin trial judge discretion and simultane-
ously advocate an institutional role for courts. The overruling of a Wein-
feld opinion—a rare occurrence—became a matter of judicial
interpretation by the appellate or Supreme Court, as envisioned by
Tribe’s five-part scheme of judicial analysis, where once again discretion
is at its highest.117 This approach for Weinfeld, and in the end Nelson,
argues for a legal institutional role for the court, whereby the judge acts
on behalf of the values of the rule of law, rather than imposing an individ-
ual policy preference.
IV. CONCLUSION
The questions introduced earlier were: (1) How often do judges incor-
porate their own policy preferences in their decisions, and how openly
does this appear in their work? (2) Does biographical analysis of judges
shed light on how their judicial philosophy formed or evolved over time?
There should be little doubt that one of the only satisfactorily compre-
hensive methods for exploring such queries is judicial biography. In fact,
with respect to the most prominent jurists in the United States today, it’s
hard to imagine a world in which such studies would not be commonplace
or would be undertaken with only limited access to the judicial record.
111. Id.




116. McKee, supra note 25, at 1710, 1717.
117. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 155.
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In the end, the paradox of judging is to be as impartial as possible while
somehow capitalizing on one’s life experience as a guide. As researchers
continue to look for clues to unravel the motivations and mechanisms
which shaped the approaches of our most important jurists, it appears
that judicial biography is here to stay. Biographies are retrospective, and
hence will most likely never assist presidents and senators in either pre-
dicting the tendencies of jurists or in selecting them for the upper eche-
lons of the legal system. Rather, judicial biographies serve a higher
purpose, layering comprehension of the individual practice of
jurisprudence.
